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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

GROWTH OF THE FOREIGN TRADE
OF COMMUNIST CHINA
1950-55

CIA/RR IM-441

16 November 1956

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FOREWORD

This memorandum presents significant factors in the growth of the foreign trade of Communist China from 1950 through 1955, with particular emphasis on the effect of military loans on the magnitude of total trade. It is the result of research done in conjunction with the preparation of EIC-R1-S5, Communist China's Imports and Exports, 1955: Trade and Transport Involved, SECRET (to be published). Although the estimates in the two documents are consistent, this memorandum contains a more detailed analysis of the role of military loans in the foreign trade of Communist China.

- iii -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary	1
I. Value of Foreign Trade, 1950-55	1
II. Role of Military Loans in Sino-Soviet Trade	2
A. Loan for 1955	3
B. Loan for 1954	4
C. Loan for 1953	6
D. Loans for Other Years	7
III. Role of Exports	9
IV. Role of Imports	10

Appendixes

Appendix A. Methodology	13
Appendix B. Source References	19

Tables

1. Estimated Value of the Foreign Trade of Communist China, by Area, 1928 and 1950-55	2
2. Estimated Value of Sino-Soviet Trade, 1953-55	3
3. Estimated Sino-Soviet Trade Account, 1955	5
4. Estimated Sino-Soviet Trade Account, 1954	6
5. Estimated Sino-Soviet Trade Account, 1953	8
6. Estimated Value of Exports of Communist China, 1950, 1953, and 1955	10

- v -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

	<u>Page</u>
7. Estimated Value of Average Annual Imports of Communist China, 1953-55	11
8. Estimated Value of the Foreign Trade of Communist China, 1950-55	15
9. Percentage Distribution of the Foreign Trade of Communist China, by Area, 1950-55	15

Chart

	<u>Following Page</u>
Relative Growth of the Elements of the Foreign Trade of Communist China, 1950-55	10

- vi -

S-E-C-R-E-T

CIA/RR IM-441
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S-E-C-R-E-T

GROWTH OF THE FOREIGN TRADE OF COMMUNIST CHINA
1950-55*

Summary

The foreign trade of Communist China has increased 240 percent since 1950, permitting the Chinese Communists to report the highest levels of trade ever achieved in the history of China. The value of foreign trade turnover in 1955 was US \$4,485 million,** an increase of nearly 40 percent above that of the highest prewar year, 1928. It appears, however, that the Chinese Communists have maximized their trade figures by including receipts of military equipment under loans from the USSR, which may have averaged \$500 million annually, or one-fourth the value of total imports, for the 3-year period 1953-55. In addition, a major export drive has been necessary in order to achieve the sharp increases in foreign trade reported from 1950 through 1955.

I. Value of Foreign Trade, 1950-55.

The Chinese Communists have announced that the total value of their foreign trade in 1954 was 8,486 million yuan (equivalent to \$3,450 million). This value is considerably higher than previous estimates and suggests that total trade may not have been in balance, as the Chinese claimed, but may have involved substantial import surpluses resulting from military deliveries. This announcement, however, provides a base year from which Chinese foreign trade in other years can be derived by using announced percentage changes in trade. The estimated value of the foreign trade of Communist China in 1928 and 1950-55 is given in Table 1.***

* The estimates and conclusions contained in this memorandum represent the best judgment of ORR as of 1 November 1956.

** Except where otherwise indicated, dollar values are given in terms of current US dollars throughout this memorandum.

*** Table 1 follows on p. 2.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 1

Estimated Value of the Foreign Trade of Communist China
by Area a/
1928 and 1950-55

Million US \$						
Area	1928	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954 1955
Sino-Soviet Bloc						
USSR		405	1,315	1,630	1,860	1,830 2,480
European Satellites		25	360	540	545	690 900
Far Eastern Satellites		10	35	50	85	240 230
Subtotal		<u>440</u>	<u>1,710</u>	<u>2,220</u>	<u>2,490</u>	<u>2,760 3,610</u>
Free World		870	990	620	810	690 875
Total	<u>3,250 b/</u>	<u>1,310</u>	<u>2,700</u>	<u>2,840</u>	<u>3,300</u>	<u>3,450 4,485</u>

a. For methodology, see Appendix A.

b. Trade for 1928 is stated in 1954 US dollars; trade for all other years is stated in current US dollars.

The Chinese Communist data exaggerate the value of commercial trade by including in foreign trade figures the equipment delivered under military loans from the USSR. If these loans are excluded, the value of Chinese trade with the USSR and in total is considerably smaller. The estimated value of Sino-Soviet trade in 1953-55 is given in Table 2.*

II. Role of Military Loans in Sino-Soviet Trade.

Military loans from the USSR averaging \$500 million annually during the 3 years 1953-55 have been revealed in statements by the Chinese Communists at the National Peoples Congresses in 1955 and 1956. The

* Table 2 follows on p. 3.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 2

Estimated Value of Sino-Soviet Trade
1953-55

Type of Trade	Million US \$		
	1953	1954	1955
Total trade with the USSR	1,860	1,830	2,480
Less military loan from the USSR	500	450	545
Commercial trade with the USSR	<u>1,360</u>	<u>1,380</u>	<u>1,935</u>
Total commercial trade with the world a/	2,800	3,000	3,940

a. Excluding deliveries of military equipment on loan from the USSR to Communist China.

Chinese budget report for 1955 specifically referred to receipts of military equipment on loan from the USSR. The budget account Credits, Loans, and Insurance which carried this loan was considerably enlarged in 1955 because of the added revenue. In 1954 this budget account was also at an abnormally high level, which the Chinese said was the result of a loan from the USSR. Other intelligence suggests military loans or grants in varying amounts before 1954.

A. Loan for 1955.

In 1955 the Chinese Communists received equipment valued at about \$620 million in the form of a loan from the USSR, of which it is estimated that approximately \$545 million represented military equipment.* The Chinese budget report of July 1955 indicated that

* It is probable that this \$620-million Soviet loan to Communist China included an amount representing the Soviet share of 4 Sino-Soviet Joint Stock Companies, which were retroceded to Communist China on 1 January 1955. China is required to pay for these assets over a period of years. The value of the Soviet share of these assets is estimated at \$75 million.

- 3 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

the primary reason for the increase in planned revenue under the account Credits, Loans, and Insurance was that the USSR turned over to China "much military material in the form of a loan" when Soviet troops withdrew from Port Arthur. 1/* The approximate size of this loan is evident through analysis of the budget report of June 1956. The Minister of Finance reported that revenue in 1956 would increase 9.29 percent over 1955 but that if foreign loans were deducted from current revenue for the 2 years, actual revenue in 1956 would be 15.83 percent greater than that in 1955. 2/ On the basis of these two statements, the loan is estimated to be \$620 million. For details, see Appendix A.

Sino-Soviet trade figures for 1955 have been greatly inflated by inclusion of the Soviet military loan, which in effect raised normal trade turnover by one-third and Chinese imports from the USSR by 65 percent. It is estimated that commercial trade between Communist China and the USSR during 1955 was approximately in balance. Available evidence indicates that in 1955 the USSR delivered about \$50 million worth of equipment to Communist China under the industrial loan granted in October 1954 and that China made a repayment of \$30 million to the USSR on the long-term industrial loan extended by the USSR in 1950. The estimated Sino-Soviet trade account for 1955 is given in Table 3.**

B. Loan for 1954.

During 1954, Communist China received a loan from the USSR with a value of from \$400 million to \$500 million. In his final report on the 1954 budget the Chinese Minister of Finance^a stated that the excess revenue in the budget account Credits, Loans, and Insurance, amounting to about \$600 million, was due primarily to a loan from the USSR. Approximately \$100 million of this excess revenue was said to represent oversubscription to a domestic bond issue. 3/ The remaining \$500 million may have included, in addition to the Soviet loan, other small items of excess income which the Minister did not specifically report. It is believed, however, that the loan from the USSR amounted to a minimum of \$400 million and probably to as much as \$500 million. For details, see Appendix A.

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.

** Table 3 follows on p. 5.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 3

Estimated Sino-Soviet Trade Account
1955

Type of Trade	Million US \$	
	Imports	Exports
Chinese exports in repayment of the 1950 industrial loan		30
Other Chinese exports to the USSR on current account		890
Chinese imports under the 1954 industrial loan	50	
Chinese acquisition of Joint Stock Company assets	75	
Other Chinese imports from the USSR on current account	890	
Total trade less military loan	<u>1,015</u>	<u>920</u>
Chinese imports under military loan	545	
Total Sino-Soviet trade	<u><u>1,560</u></u>	<u><u>920</u></u>

The specific purpose of this loan from the USSR was not announced, but it may have been used primarily to acquire military equipment. Another budget statement indicated that expenditures for national defense in 1954 exceeded the budget by 10.38 percent, 4/ equivalent to about \$225 million, which could have represented purchases of Soviet military equipment through a loan. There is no indication that this loan was used for industrial imports. The two industrial loans which China has received from the USSR (\$300 million in 1950 and \$130 million in 1954) were both widely publicized, implying that similar treatment would be given to any additional economic loans that might be extended.

The military loan of 1954 had the effect of raising total Sino-Soviet trade 30 percent above the level of commercial trade in that year. The nonmilitary trade of Communist China with the USSR

S-E-C-R-E-T

in 1954 was in approximate balance. At the end of the year the Chinese were to have made the first repayment of \$30 million to the USSR on the long-term industrial loan of 1950, and during 1954 the Chinese received \$60 million as the last installment of that loan. The estimated Sino-Soviet trade account for 1954 is given in Table 4.

Table 4

Estimated Sino-Soviet Trade Account
1954

Type of Trade	Million US \$	
	Imports	Exports
Chinese exports in repayment of the 1950 industrial loan		30
Other Chinese exports to the USSR on current account		645
Chinese imports under the 1950 industrial loan	60	
Other Chinese imports from the USSR on current account	645	
Total trade less military loan	<u>705</u>	<u>675</u>
Chinese imports under military loan	450	
Total Sino-Soviet trade	<u><u>1,155</u></u>	<u><u>675</u></u>

C. Loan for 1953.

It has been estimated that in 1953 Communist China received military equipment from the USSR amounting to about \$800 million. ^{5/} It is believed that the Chinese may have paid for approximately \$300 million of this military equipment through the regular barter trade agreement with the USSR and that the remaining \$500 million of military equipment was obtained under some loan or lease arrangement.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Comparison of the Sino-Soviet trade accounts for 1953 and 1954 suggests a military loan in 1953 similar to those of 1954 and 1955. Total Sino-Soviet trade in 1954 is estimated at \$1,830 million. Trade in 1954, however, was inflated by the inclusion of \$450 million in the form of a loan from the USSR, so that normal Sino-Soviet barter trade in that year was only \$1,380 million. By contrast, Sino-Soviet trade in 1953 was \$1,860 million; and if this amount represented only barter trade, then Sino-Soviet barter trade declined from \$1,860 million in 1953 to \$1,380 million in 1954. Such a decline would be unlikely, however, particularly in view of the planned acceleration of Chinese Communist imports and the inability to obtain needed equipment from the Free World. It is more probable that a part of the total trade in 1953 represented a loan from the USSR to finance the high level of military imports, similar to the loans received in previous years.

The size of the military loan in 1953 may have been roughly \$500 million. It has been estimated that Communist China made current payments on the Soviet barter account of no more than \$300 million for military equipment in the 2 years 1954 and 1955, obtaining the balance of military goods in those years on loan. ^{6/} It is not likely that the Chinese paid more than \$300 million for military goods on the current barter account in 1953. Inasmuch as total military deliveries in 1953 were \$800 million, it is probable that the military loan amounted to about \$500 million.

The estimated military receipts on loan in 1953 represent 25 percent of total Sino-Soviet trade and 40 percent of Chinese imports from the USSR. Commercial transactions were nearly in balance in 1953, although the Chinese received about \$60 million of equipment from the USSR under the long-term industrial loan of 1950. The estimated Sino-Soviet trade account for 1953 is given in Table 5.*

D. Loans for Other Years.

The Chinese Communists have made no statements concerning military loans in the period 1950-52, and it is difficult to ascertain from available intelligence of that period whether or not military equipment was delivered to China on a loan. Analysis of Chinese statements regarding their foreign trade in 1950, however, suggests that some form of military loan may have been used in that year. Official Chinese data for 1950, allegedly from customs returns, show

* Table 5 follows on p. 8.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 5
Estimated Sino-Soviet Trade Account
1953

Type of Trade	Million US \$	
	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Chinese exports to the USSR on current account		650
Chinese imports under the 1950 industrial loan	60	
Other Chinese imports from the USSR on current account	650	
Total trade less military loan	<u>710</u>	<u>650</u>
Chinese imports under military loan	500	
Total Sino-Soviet trade	<u>1,210</u>	<u>650</u>

a detailed percentage breakdown of imports and exports by country and commodity, which is consistent with (adjusted) trade returns of non-Communist countries. Other Chinese announcements on the dollar value of exports in 1950 indicate that the total trade was \$1,082 million. ^{7/} Several indexes of Chinese trade which were published later, however, suggest a higher level of trade in 1950. One such index, apparently in terms of yuan, placed 1950 trade at \$1,310 million. Data issued in conjunction with this index indicated that the proportion of Chinese Communist trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1950 was 33 percent, whereas the customs data had indicated that this proportion was 26 percent. ^{8/} Since the customs data clearly did not include military imports, it seems likely that the 1950 trade data may have been revised upward to account for deliveries of Soviet military equipment on a loan or grant basis. If some type of military loan was granted in 1950, it probably did not exceed \$200 million.

There is no evidence that Communist China received military loans in 1951 and 1952, although the intelligence information used to derive estimates of such loans for other years is not available

S-E-C-R-E-T

on a comparable basis before 1953. The value of the total trade of China during both 1951 and 1952 was sufficiently great to have included military loans or gifts of several hundred million dollars, if such loans were in fact negotiated.

The Chinese Communists have made no reference to a military loan from the USSR in 1956. The Chinese budget implies that during 1956 the only foreign loan available will be approximately \$55 million from the USSR as an installment on the industrial loan of October 1954. The Chinese announced that total expenditures on national defense in 1956 will be 350 million yuan less than in 1955. ^{9/} In terms of internal resources, however, expenditures on national defense will actually increase in 1956. The military revenues in 1955 included a military loan from the USSR of approximately \$545 million. A comparison of Chinese defense allocations from internal resources alone shows an increase of 1,175 million yuan in 1956 above the allocations of 1955.

III. Role of Exports.

In spite of the importance of military loans in the total value of the foreign trade of Communist China, the impressive increases in trade since 1950 have resulted primarily from expansion of exports. Although Chinese total trade in 1955 increased 240 percent over 1950, Chinese exports during the interval increased 250 percent. The responsibility of growing exports, rather than military loans, for Chinese trade expansion is evident from the accompanying chart.*

Chinese Communist exports have risen sharply from the level of 1949. Communist data indicate that exports increased from \$215 million in the first half of 1950 to about \$350 million in the second half of the year. It has been estimated that exports reached an annual level of \$1.5 billion by 1953 and 1954, approximating the prewar volume (in constant prices). The estimated value of Chinese exports for 1950, 1953, and 1955 is given in Table 6.**

* Following p. 10.

** Table 6 follows on p. 10.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 6

Estimated Value of Exports of Communist China a/
1950, 1953, and 1955

Million US \$			
Type of Export	1950	1953	1955 <u>b/</u>
Cereals, oil, and seeds	210	600	650
Textile fibers and products	80	150	200
Animal products	130	300	400
Miscellaneous vegetable products	65	250	350
Coal, metals, and minerals	30	100	150
Other commercial exports	50	100	250
Total	<u>565</u>	<u>1,500</u>	<u>2,000</u>

a. 10/

b. Including exports of aid materials to North Korea and North Vietnam with a value of approximately \$120 million.


As indicated in Table 6, the growth of Chinese Communist total trade has been supported largely by expansion of traditional Chinese export commodities. A number of observers have reported that the Chinese people are keenly aware of large food exports and tend to censure the USSR for shortages of certain foods. 11/ Although there has been increasing propaganda about Chinese export of light industrial manufactures -- such as sewing machines, bicycles, fountain pens, and textile machinery -- Chinese Communist data indicate that total exports of such products amounted to only \$60 million in 1954 and to \$75 million in 1955.

IV. Role of Imports.

The sustained export drive of the Chinese Communists is caused by the need to import equipment and supplies for the industrialization program. This policy has resulted in a complete reversal of the traditional pattern of importing foodstuffs and consumer goods. The Chinese stated that more than 90 percent of total imports in 1955 were

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RELATIVE GROWTH OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE FOREIGN TRADE OF COMMUNIST CHINA, 1950-55



The slope of the dashed lines indicates growth of each factor.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

investment goods, presumably including military equipment. Total Chinese imports during the first 3 years of the First Five Year Plan (1953-57) have averaged about \$2,100 million annually, with their composition approximately as given in Table 7.

Table 7

Estimated Value of Average Annual Imports of Communist China a/
1953-55

	Million US \$
Type of Import	Amount
Equipment for basic construction projects	525
Military equipment on current trade account	200
Essential raw materials and supplies	400
Vehicles, metals, and agricultural and other machinery	250
Consumer goods	225
Subtotal	<u>1,600</u>
Imports under military loan from the USSR	500
Total	<u><u>2,100</u></u>

a. 12/

The largest single category of Chinese Communist imports consists of machinery and equipment required for specific industrial projects. According to Chinese announcements, funds for the purchase of mechanical equipment comprise 38 percent of total investment in basic construction projects during the First Five Year Plan. The Chinese must import 40 percent of this equipment, or 15 percent of the total investment in basic construction. 13/ These imports represent the more highly developed machines and equipment which the Chinese are incapable of producing but which are vital to the attainment of the industrialization program. Chinese announcements stress the growing need for such imports. For example, the Chinese announced that in 1956, when domestic production of machine tools is expected to reach 27,000 units, the import plan is more than 10,000 machine tools, 14/ probably of the more complicated types not available internally.

- 11 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

The Chinese Communists are equally dependent on imported supplies of metals, vehicles, agricultural machinery, and essential raw materials, and apparently these needs also will continue to grow. In 1956, when Chinese steel production is officially scheduled to be 4.5 million metric tons, the Chinese plan to import 750,000 metric tons of steel to meet expanding industrial needs. 15/ Agricultural machinery, particularly tractors, is being imported in large volume during 1956 from the USSR and the European Satellites, while at the same time the Chinese have offered to purchase tractors in quantity from the Free World. 16/ The Chinese also will continue to be dependent on imports for their major supplies of rubber, petroleum products, and certain chemicals.

The Chinese Communists have frequently acknowledged the vital role of imports in China's industrialization. They have appealed to the Chinese people to restrict consumption of exportable commodities in order to pay for a greater volume of imports required in the development of the economy. That such appeals have been successful is apparent from the high levels of trade achieved in recent years.

- 12 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

I. Foreign Trade of Communist China, 1950-55.

The amount of information in Chinese Communist trade announcements has varied sharply from year to year. Data on trade in 1950 were published in great detail. In contrast, only a few summary statistics were announced on trade during the active Korean War hostilities in 1951 and 1952. Since 1952 the Chinese Communists have released more information on their total foreign trade, although with less detail than reported in 1950.

The Chinese Communist announcements are usually stated in percentages,* are rarely clearly defined, and often appear mutually contradictory. For example, the announcements may refer to different aspects of trade. The Chinese have not stated whether their trade statistics include Soviet military deliveries or other imports and exports made under various grant or loan programs. They have seldom reported the monetary units in which their trade statistics are expressed. Although the Chinese have implied that their trade with the USSR during 1950-55 was conducted at 1950 world prices, this claim has not been fully checked, and it is possible that some trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, particularly grant-in-aid shipments to North Korea and North Vietnam, may be recorded at inflated prices to exaggerate the real value of trade. All of these factors may introduce errors into interpretations of the Chinese announcements and thus may affect final estimates of the actual level of trade. In view of these uncertainties, it has been necessary to select from the various Chinese Communist statements those data believed to provide the most reasonable description of Chinese trade.

Given the value of foreign trade of Communist China in 1954, 17/ it is possible to estimate the value of total trade for the years 1950-55 from the following summaries of Chinese announcements as to the annual percentage changes in trade:

* With the exception of 1954, when the monetary value of total exports and imports was reported.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

1. Trade in 1953 increased by 36 percent above that in 1952. 18/
2. Trade in 1953 increased by 81 percent above that in 1950. 19/
3. Trade in 1954 increased by 4.5 percent above that in 1953. 20/
4. Trade in 1955 increased by 30 percent above that in 1954. 21/

All of these percentage figures have been announced since August 1954 and appear for the most part to reflect final rather than preliminary trade statistics. These more recent Chinese percentage announcements appear to be based on the yuan value of trade rather than on either the more stable US dollar or ruble measures. No recent percentage figure has been given for the increase in Chinese trade (in terms of yuan) from 1950 to 1951. An index of total trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc reveals, however, an increase of Sino-Soviet Bloc trade of 155 percent from 1950 to 1951. 22/ From this index and from the percentage distribution of 1951 trade between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Free World, it is possible to compute total Chinese trade for 1951 as 6,052 million yuan. The estimated total foreign trade of Communist China for 1950-55, expressed in yuan and converted into US dollars at the current rates of exchange for the specific years involved,* is given in Table 8.**

In 1956 the Chinese Communists published a table showing the proportions of their trade with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries and the Free World from 1950 through 1953. 24/ The percentage distribution of the foreign trade of Communist China for 1950-55 is given in Table 9.*** For 1954 and 1955, comparable figures have been included on the basis of other independent Chinese announcements. 25/

* In the absence of US-Chinese trade and currency remittances carried on directly in yuan and dollars, there is no genuine rate of foreign exchange between the two currencies for trade purposes. The rate of exchange used to convert the yuan value of the foreign trade of Communist China into US dollars is the average between the buying and selling rates for sterling remittances in Canton. 23/ The sterling rate is consistent with the remittance rates for other Free World currencies in Canton. Use of this sterling crossrate permits conversion of yuan into dollars through a currency which actually is exchanged directly into Chinese yuan.

** Table 8 follows on p. 15.

*** Table 9 follows on p. 15.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 8

Estimated Value of the Foreign Trade of Communist China
1950-55

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>
Total trade (million yuan)	4,486	6,052	5,970	8,120	8,487	11,030
Exchange rate	(3.425)	(2.240)	(2.100)	(2.460)	(2.460)	(2.460)
Total trade (million US \$)	1,310	2,700	2,840	3,300	3,450	4,485

Table 9

Percentage Distribution of the Foreign Trade of Communist China
by Area a/
1950-55

<u>Area</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1955</u>
USSR	30.89	48.72	57.34	56.39	53.0	55.3
European Satellites	1.99	13.24	19.02	16.58	20.0	20.0
Far Eastern Satellites	0.60	1.32	1.72	2.52	7.0	5.2
Free World	66.52	36.72	21.92	24.51	20.0	19.5

a. Percent of total trade.

- 15 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

II. Derivation of Chinese Communist Military Loans from the USSR, 1954-55.

Statements made by the Chinese Communist Minister of Finance in his reports on the Chinese budget for 1954 and 1955 reveal the approximate size of the military loans which the USSR extended to China in those years.

1. Loan for 1955.

The Chinese Communist Minister of Finance stated that total revenue in 1956 would increase by 9.29 percent above that in 1955 but that if foreign loans are deducted from current revenue for the 2 years, actual revenue in 1956 would be 15.83 percent greater than in 1955. Application of these percentages to announced revenue figures results in the following estimate:

	<u>Amount</u>
1956 revenue	29,732 million yuan
Less foreign loans	142 million yuan
1956 revenue net of foreign loans	<u>29,590</u> million yuan
(Increase of 1956 above 1955	15.83 percent)
1955 revenue net of foreign loans	<u>25,546</u> million yuan
Current 1955 revenue (including foreign loans)	27,203 million yuan
Less revenue net of foreign loans	25,546 million yuan
Amount of 1955 foreign loans	<u>1,657</u> million yuan
Less installment on the industrial loan of 1954	132 million yuan
Amount of 1955 loan	<u>1,525</u> million yuan
US dollar equivalent value of the 1955 loan	620 million

- 16 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

2. Loan for 1954.

The Chinese Communist Minister of Finance reported that revenue in the 1954 budget account Credits, Loans, and Insurance exceeded the plan by 90.98 percent and stated: "This is accounted for not only by the income from Government bonds, which exceeded the original plan by 236.130 million yuan, but mainly because a loan from the Soviet Government was added to this income." The size of the loan is estimated as follows:

	<u>Amount</u>
Revenue in Credits, Loans, and Insurance	3,057 million yuan
Less planned revenue in Credits, Loans, and Insurance	1,601 million yuan
Amount of excess revenue in Credits, Loans, and Insurance	<u>1,456</u> million yuan
Less excess income from government bonds	236 million yuan
Remainder, representing primarily the Soviet loan	<u>1,220</u> million yuan
US dollar equivalent value of the remainder (approximate)	500 million

It is possible that the overfulfillment in this account may have resulted from causes other than the two stated -- excess income from government bonds and the loan from the USSR -- but the phraseology employed in the budget statement seems to imply that any other items would have been relatively insignificant.

- 17 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

APPENDIX B

SOURCE REFERENCES

Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance:

<u>Source of Information</u>	<u>Information</u>
Doc. - Documentary	1 - Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable	2 - Probably true
B - Usually reliable	3 - Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable	4 - Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable	5 - Probably false
E - Not reliable	6 - Cannot be judged
F - Cannot be judged	

"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."

Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this memorandum. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document.

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1. [REDACTED]
OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
2. Ibid., 22 Jun 55, p. AAA 28. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
3. Ibid., 11 Jul 55, p. AAA 11-12. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
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5. CIA. EIC-RI-83, Communist China's Imports and Exports, 1953, Trade and Shipping Involved, Aug 54. S.

- 19 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

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